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ALD-274        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1849 
___________ 
 
AKEEM R. GUMBS, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LOUIS PENN, JR. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the District of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-16-cv-00030) 
District Judge:  Honorable Curtis V. Gómez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 8, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 28, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
  Akeem R. Gumbs appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his in forma 
pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).  We will dismiss this appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
I. 
 Gumbs was convicted in the District of the Virgin Islands of 31 counts relating to 
his production and possession of child pornography and his multiple rapes of his eight-
year-old niece (which he filmed).  The District Court sentenced him to 300 months of 
imprisonment, and we affirmed.  See United States v. Gumbs, 562 F. App’x 110 (3d Cir. 
2014) (per curiam).  Gumbs’s prosecution was based largely on materials that officers 
seized from his home while executing a search warrant.  Agent Louis Penn, Jr., obtained 
that warrant on the basis of his affidavit of probable cause.  Gumbs raised Fourth 
Amendment challenges to the warrant and its procurement before his trial and on appeal, 
but both the District Court and this Court rejected them.  See id. at 113-14.   
Gumbs later challenged his convictions in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He 
claimed, among other things, that his counsel should have argued that the warrant was 
defective because Agent Penn’s affidavit did not specify the dates on which Gumbs 
produced child pornography.  According to Gumbs, Agent Penn’s affidavit thus violated 
his Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”  
The District Court denied Gumbs’s § 2255 motion, and it denied this claim in particular 
because Gumbs’s Sixth Amendment rights had not attached when Agent Penn submitted 
his affidavit and because Gumbs’s right to notice of the charges was secured by his 
indictment.  Gumbs appealed that ruling at C.A. No. 17-1608, and we are denying his  
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request for a certificate of appealability.  
 About two months after the District Court denied Gumbs’s § 2255 motion, he filed 
the civil action at issue here.  He named Agent Penn as the sole defendant and repeated 
his claim, this time under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Penn’s affidavit violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to notice of the charges against him.  Gumbs did not request any relief 
from his conviction.  Instead, he alleged that Penn’s affidavit and the criminal proceeding 
flowing therefrom resulted in the loss of his employment with Home Depot.  On that 
basis, he requested monetary damages for lost wages.  The District Court dismissed 
Gumbs’s complaint for failure to state a claim for the same reasons it denied his claim in 
the § 2255 context.  Gumbs appeals. 
II. 
 We will dismiss this appeal as frivolous because it “lacks an arguable basis either 
in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  Gumbs appears to 
acknowledge that, as the District Court properly concluded, his Sixth Amendment right to 
notice of the charges did not arise until the initiation of criminal proceedings.  See Moore 
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1977); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 946-47 (6th 
Cir. 2002).  Gumbs argues, however, that his criminal proceeding commenced when he 
appeared before a Magistrate Judge two days after Penn submitted his affidavit and that 
the affidavit began to violate his Sixth Amendment right at that time.   
This argument is frivolous.  Once criminal proceedings are commenced, the Sixth 
Amendment right to notice of the charges is secured by the indictment or other charging 
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instrument.  See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1962); United States v. 
Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 2000); Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 & n.2 
(9th Cir. 1989).  Gumbs’s allegations regarding the affidavit of probable cause have 
nothing to do with his indictment, which the District Court has found sufficient.  The 
affidavit and warrant were subject to the Fourth Amendment, but we already have upheld 
the warrant and its procurement and Gumbs raises no Fourth Amendment claim in any 
event.   
 One final issue warrants discussion.  The “three strikes” provision of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act restricts prisoners’ ability to bring civil actions or appeals in forma 
pauperis after they have brought three civil actions or appeals that have been dismissed 
on the ground that they were “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  The District Court’s dismissal of Gumbs’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under this provision, and our 
dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike as well.  See Byrd v. Shannon, 715 
F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, if Gumbs brings another civil action or appeal that is 
dismissed on one of the grounds enumerated in § 1915(g), he will be precluded from 
bringing a civil action or appeal in forma pauperis unless he is “under imminent danger 
of serious physical injury.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  Gumbs should bear this in mind before 
filing any civil action or appeal in the future. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss this appeal as frivolous. 
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